As one quickly comes to realize in the study of politics, the "rules of the game," the institutional design can determine the fate of the players in the game. This could be no truer than in the French political system. Surrounding the French presidential election of 1981 was an absolutely extraordinary set of circumstances that moved the France into a new phase of politics. From these circumstantial anomalies emerged the first Socialist president of the Fifth Republic; indeed, the election of Socialist François Mitterrand marked the first administration change in the Fifth Republic. Since this election in 1981, the French electorate has been increasingly willing to venture into unknown political territory and accept nontraditional developments in the administration. This change in attitude is apparent mostly in Mitterrand’s election, but also in the events that followed the election: the first coalition administration, the development of unlikely political bedfellows who still manage to muster a sizable percentage of votes, and the fruition of various reforms that would have been viewed as radical only a decade or so before. It seems that the election of 1981 introduced more than a new President for the French people, it also brought new concepts for the French political system.
The most important set of circumstances that gave Mitterrand the advantage over Giscard was Giscard’s incumbency itself. Usually, being an incumbent is an advantage. This was not the case, however, during the 1981 French elections. The incumbent seemed to have been cursed with many political misfortunes during his Presidential term; these crippling situations included internal things that he could have controlled (and chose to ignore), and external forces that were beyond the incumbent’s control.
The internal political shortcomings seemed to have done Giscard as much harm (if not more harm) than the external factors that attributed to his electoral loss. Giscard, a pragmatic leader, had an haughty and disparaging personality. The characteristic of Giscard led him to be very inaccessible not only to the French people themselves (who were beginning to tire after twenty-three years of Rightist administration besides), but led him to be inaccessible to the other cabinet members whose support he needed to reinforce his political legitimacy. His condescending and disparaging perspective led him to conclude that others involved in the political machine were inept and ill-suited to correctly implement his important policy decisions. With this view, Giscard took over the most minute details in his policy-making, leaving his Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, his ministers, and several layers of civil servants without duties and ultimately without any power. Each of these different groups within the administration thrives on the implementation of policy. Most of the cabinet was effectively ignored, and none of the ministers felt that they had a say in the direction that Giscard was taking France. Another group of the administration, the bureaucracy, the civil servants also had their function greatly reduced. When studying French politics it is difficult to miss the importance of the civil servants in the political system. There is a sense of pride and significance derived from the coveted positions in French civil service. Indeed, efficient, effective, and loyal civil service can lead to ministerial positions and other political leadership positions within the system. Without a task to be effective, efficient, and loyal at, however, there was no vehicle for the civil servants to prove their abilities. Under Giscard, the civil servants were effectively robbed of this pride and felt like a bureaucratic "stamp brigade." The position of Prime Minister, the one most affected by Giscard’s dictatorial style of policy-making, is a position that derives power and legitimacy from the authority to implement policy. Without this duty to be performed, the Prime Minister is merely a figurehead without participation in either the executive or the legislative functions of the government. Giscard’s removal of power from his Prime Minister was one of the factors that led Chirac to run in the election of 1981, a decision that would ultimately determine the fate of the 1981 election.
Even with Giscard’s obsessive control over policy implementation, another internal political shortcoming of the incumbent Giscard appeared to be his ineffective tactics for deciding policy strategy. To the public, at least, Giscard’s policies seemed to be sporadic, hasty, and ill-timed reforms. These reforms were unpopular with the Right because they were too liberal and involved more government involvement. They were also unpopular with the Left because they had several serious economic repercussions. However, many of the other platform issues that Giscard had run on in his previous election had been abandoned during creation of the administration’s agenda. These policies were major reform issues, not petty hot-button, item-of-the-day issues; they were conspicuous (if not overly ambitious) pledges that were never quite undertaken during his presidency. A poll taken June 1980 showed that, besides the Rightists, even people on the Left (15% of Socialists and 13% of Communists) had liked and endorsed Giscard previously because of his reformist attitude. By April 1981, however, this endorsement had dropped radically on the Left (7% and 1% of Socialists and Communists respectively), and had not risen dramatically on the Right. But as the election wore on, and Chirac joined the race, Giscard had to appeal to his Rightist constituency and drop most of these radical views. As a result, his popularity fell and he was thought of as an opportunist. He had promised to be open to the opposition in Parliament, but the opposite had occurred, in fact. Because of his personality and his control over policy implementation, the executive powers had become highly centralized; control was concentrated in the hands of Giscard and his cabinet composed of a few trusted friends—namely, Michel Poniatowski, a "faithful friend and advisor".
If Giscard’s internal political handicaps had effectively "crippled" him in the initial race, the external factors that decided the 1981 election were a deadly blow. Neatly summarized in an article by Hugh Dauncey: "It was Giscard's double misfortune that his presidency should be blighted both by unprecedented economic difficulties, and by a political system which was stubbornly unreceptive to the ouverture and centralist compromise that he required for his reforms to fully succeed". The electoral and party system (political system) in France had, indeed, undergone many gradual yet critical changes during the previous years. Universal suffrage, direct election, and the introduction of the two-round, majority vote requirement played a large role in the election of 1981. The new electoral system divided the various Rightist and Leftist factions within themselves during the first round (In a previous election, for example, the Left had introduced too many candidates during the first round, and had no candidate to run against the Right), but led to Right and Left polarization during the second round. This forces the Right and Left to strategize for both the first and second parts of the election. To survive the first part of a French election, only a small number of separate parties from the Right and the Left can participate, represent their groups, and carry their party’s banner without penalizing their Rightist or Leftist ability to get into the second round. And each candidate must present him or herself in as the better candidate while being careful not to remove all credibility of his/her fellow Right or Left candidates, as their opponents may have to run again in the next round against the opposing Right or Left candidate. In the second round, however, total unity must be achieved. This leads to the movement of both groups toward the center, with coalitions between center groups and extremists within the Right and Left. With these new "rules of the game," Mitterrand came into power.
The electoral "rules of the game," was one of the most notable factors that decided the 1981 French presidential election. The division within the Right between the two main Rightist factions, Giscard’s Union pour la democratie François (UDF), and Chirac’s neo-Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) was the final blow to Giscard (Painton, par. 12). When Chirac lost the "primary," he, in effect, refused to endorse Giscard as the candidate of the Right to the party constituents. Other, similarly important events had also been taking place within the party during Giscard’s presidency. Several of the Right’s ministers and high-ranking officials had been involved in various moral and monetary scandals. This put a damper on the Right’s general popularity and was a contributing factor to Giscard’s loss. During the presidential campaign, large posters of Giscard were defaced with large diamonds that were placed over his eyes to remind the public of the questionable diamonds that the President had accepted from Jean Bedel Bokassa, self-proclaimed "emperor" of the Central African Empire. There was also the tactical ingenuity on the part of the Left that brought about Mitterrand’s victory. As author Penniman points out, in a shrewd move, the Left gained "strength through disunity." The Right’s disunity between the UDF and RPR factions brought about the downfall of their major candidate. The split between the Left’s Socialist and Communist Parties, however, allowed the electorate to be more comfortable voting for the Socialists while gaining the Communist Party votes, which retains roughly 20% of the electorate votes.
Outside of the party politics, several other external factors gave Mitterrand and the Left added advantage. The economy was in shambles—unemployment was up, inflation was rising, oil prices were rising—and France had fallen behind in modernization, trade, and other global economic relations (investments). Some of these fluctuations in the French economy were a result of the President’s shortsightedness; other of these economic disasters had absolutely nothing to do with the President himself. Besides the floundering economy, there were also several other events that were still fresh in the minds of the French people. Earlier during Giscard’s presidency, there had been a student revolt and a general strike that paralyzed the government; these events, too faired badly for Giscard’s public image. The French electorate, tired of Giscard’s failed policies and strategy blunders, looked to a new President with whom they could build a better working relationship.
In the end, the Left received 52% of the vote, and the Right trailed 4% behind. It seems the appropriate question to ask of the 1981 French elections is not "How did François Mitterrand win?" It is more prudent to ask "What happened to cause Giscard d'Estaing’s loss?" It seems that the incumbent President had the deck stacked against him, and faced insurmountable circumstances that would bring any political player to his or her knees. The strife within his own political career and within the Right’s general parties attacked the candidate on a personal level. As the French economy continued the downward turn, other unforeseen changes in the faceless and impersonal political system worked against him from the edges. These sets of disadvantages, coupled with a stronger, more strategically developed Left led to the election of the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic, Francois Mitterrand.
Bibliography
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